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C H A P T E R  N I N E  
Central-Provincial In vestment a nd F inance: The Cultural 
Revolution and I ts L egacy in Jiangsu P rovince 
PENELOPE B. PRIME 
Mention of the Cultural Revolution elicits tales of making "revolution." 
Struggle sessions, political study, and Red Guard battles left schools and 
factories barely functioning. After the worst of the turmoil in 1966 and 
1967, however, promoting production became part of making revolu­
tion. Existing enterprises were revived and new ones were built. Re­
sponding to the slogan "Grasp revolution, promote production," even 
Red Guard students planted gardens and ran small factory workshops at 
their schools. As a result, production recovered after 1968 and growth 
rates, particularly industrial growth rates, were high for the rest of the 
CR period (1966-1976). 
China's growth during the Cultural Revolution was shaped by Mao's 
development policies. Three key policies were the decentralization of en­
terprises between 1968 and 1970; the promotion of small-scale industry; 
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and central, Third Front investment in inland provinces to ensure China's 
survival in case of a coastal attack. These policies are analyzed in Chapters 
6—8. In this chapter I examine the economic results of these policies in 
one particular case, Jiangsu Province. 
One issue raised by the nature of these CR policies is what effect they 
had on central-local relations.1 For example, Christine Wong has argued, 
in this volume and elsewhere, that decentralization and the small-scale 
industry program increased economic production initiated at the county 
level with concurrent increases in local control over funds and output. 
At the same time there is evidence that the central government increased 
spending on its projects and maintained the ability to shift resources 
between regions and sectors. For example, between 1971 and 1975 the 
center's budgetary expenditures were 212.5 billion yuan, compared with 
153.8 billion yuan during the previous five years.2 The number of local 
enterprises and the importance of their output also increased substan­
tially, and yet the type of investment that occurred continued to reflect 
the center's priority of emphasizing heavy industry. 
In the case of J iangsu I show evidence that decentralization and county-
commune industrialization indeed occurred. But these developments did 
not result in any significant change in central-provincial revenue flows: 
the provincial budget did not gain at the expense of the center. This 
suggests the hypothesis that the 1970 decentralization was basically ad­
ministrative, and that the province's industrial growth was financed pri­
marily by shifting resources horizontally from other sectors rather than 
vertically from the center to the provinces. 
This is not to say that the Maoist policies did not affect China's econ­
omy during the CR period. For example, local officials clearly cared about 
the funds and output they gained with the small-scale industry program, 
leading them to overinvest in industry whether profitable or not. This is 
one of the unintended consequences of Maoist policies described in Chap­
ter 8. A second consequence was the weakening of central planning, but 
without replacing planning with markets, as described in Chapters 6 and 
7. But the case of Jiangsu suggests that these phenomena were not sig­
nificant enough to alter fundamentally the central-provincial balance of 
power as reflected in budgetary flows. This result is underscored by events 
in the reform period that began a different type of decentralization char­
acterized by major increases in economic activity outside the state bud­
getary system altogether. 
To develop this hypothesis this chapter first looks at growth in Jiangsu 
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to show that substantial increases in industry occurred, with a growing 
share of industrial output produced at local levels. The second section 
analyzes the investment patterns behind Jiangsu's industrial growth dur­
ing the Cultural Revolution. It shows that provincial investment in­
creased compared with central investment in the province, but that the 
decentralization of enterprises and shifts in budgetary expenditure toward 
industry explain much of the rise in provincial investment. The third 
section analyzes the province's collection and remittance of budgetary 
revenue to the center. The data imply that the provincial budget did not 
gain at the expense of the central budget during the CR. Rather, once 
decentralization and economic growth are accounted for, revenue flows 
appear normal compared with historical trends, with the province contin­
uing to maintain its financial contribution to the center. Finally, the 
chapter concludes with some comments on the representativeness of Jiangsu 
and the implications of these results for understanding China's economy 
during the culmination of Maoist economics. 
GROWTH WITH LOCAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Except for 1967 and 1968, both the national and Jiangsu's provincial 
economies were characterized by substantial industrial growth during the 
CR period, as shown by Table 1. In 1967 and 1968 output fell an av­
erage of 8.2 percent in Jiangsu and 9.5 percent nationally. If we exclude 
the first two years, industrial growth averaged 16.3 percent per year in 
Jiangsu and 13-5 percent nationally between 1969 and 1976. Even in­
cluding the poor-performance years, however, Jiangsu's average annual 
growth was 11.9 percent between 1966 and 1976, and the national av­
erage was 9-5 percent for the same years. So, despite the political tur­
moil, industrial growth in Jiangsu during the Cultural Revolution ex­
ceeded average annual growth rates during the First Five-Year Plan and 
the Great Leap Forward, and was slightly higher than the average for the 
thirty years between 1953 and 1982. 
In addition to overall industrial growth rates, there is evidence that 
industry was growing faster at local levels. Unfortunately a complete 
breakdown of industrial growth of state-owned enterprises managed at 
different administrative levels, and by collective and commune (town­
ship) industry, is not currently available by province.3 Selected figures 
for collective and commune industry, however, provide a partial indica-
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TABLE 1 Comparative Annual Average 
Growth Rates of Gross Value of 
Industrial Output in China and 
Jiangsu, 1953—1982 
Year China Jiangsu 
1953-1957 18.0 10.7 
1958-1962 3.8 4.7 
(1959-1962) (-6.0) (-5.7) 
1963-1965 17.9 19.2 
1966-1976 9.5 11.9 
(1966-1968) (-0.3) (1.1) 
(1967-1968) (-9.5) (-8.2) 
(1969-1976) (13.5) (16.3) 
1977-1982 9.4 13.2 
1953-1982 10.7 11.4 
Sources: Zhongguo tongji nianjian, 1983 (China's statistical year­
book, 1983; Beijing, Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1983), 
p. 17; Jiangsu jingji nianjian, 1984 (Jiangsu's economic 
yearbook, 1984; Nanjing, Jiangsu tongji ju, 1984), pp. 
93-94. 
Note: These compounded growth rates are calculated from in­
dices and data on the gross value of industrial output based 
on comparable prices. The rates are sensitive to the years 
included in each subperiod. When the continuous rates 
are particularly sensitive to the endpoints, figures for al­
ternative subperiods are also given, in parentheses. 
tion of the increased importance of enterprises that were primarily under 
the jurisdiction of municipal, county, or commune administrations. 
Table 2 presents both collective (including commune) and commune 
industry as proportions of total gross value of industrial output for China 
and for Guangdong, Liaoning, and Jiangsu, for selected years. Guang­
dong and Liaoning have been included as a comparison to the trends 
observed in Jiangsu. These figures show that increases in local industry 
during the Cultural Revolution varied in magnitude by province, but in 
each case increases occurred that were consistent with the national trend. 
Looking first at total collective industry, we see that in China nation­
ally the share of industrial output produced by collectively owned enter­
prises increased from .099 in 1965 to . 192 in 1978. In Guangdong the 
proportion of collectives increased from .191 in 1965 to .254 in 1975 
TABLE 2 Collective and Commune Industry as Proportions of 
Total Gross Value of Industrial Output in China, 
Jiangsu, Guangdong, and Liaoning, 1962-1985 
China Jiangsu Guangdong Liaoning 
Collec­ Com­ Collec­ Com­ Collec­ Com­ Collec­ Com­
Year tive mune* tive mune* tive mune* tive mune* 
1962 n.a. n.a. .268 .016 .243 .028 .083 n.a. 
1965 .099 n.a. .114 .011 -191 .017 .066 .003 
1970 .110 n.a. .088 .031 .213 .006 .084 .005 
1975 n.a. n.a. .280 .065 .254 .036 .154 .023 
1978 .192 (• 102) .340 .120 .274 .067 .164 .034 
1980 .207 (.119) .368 .154 .295 .072 .179 .034 
1983 .220 (.151) .394 .177 .313 .079 . 185 b .037b 
1985 .249 .104 .407 . 166 .301 .110 .217 .075 
(.119) 
Sources: For China—Zhongguo tongji nianjian, 1986 (China's statistical yearbook, 1986; Beijing, Zhongguo 
tongji chubanshe, 1986), p. 273, for total and collective gross value of industrial output. 
These output figures are given in 1952 prices for output up to 1957, 1957 prices up to 1970, 
1970 prices up to 1980, and 1980 prices up to 1985. Figures for commune industrial output 
are not currently available from Chinese published sources except for 1985. Figures in paren­
theses are Christine P. W. Wong's estimates, which take changes in reporting methods into 
account ("Interpreting Rural Industrial Growth in the Post-Mao Period," Modem China 14:3-
30(1988]). Note that China's 1986 statistical yearbook gives two figures for commune industry 
in 1985, one on p. 273, which results in a proportion of .277, and one on p. 282, which 
results in a proportion of . 104 (included in this table). This difference probably reflects an 
attempt to account for changes in how commune-level output is counted, especially after 1984, 
as described by Wong. 
For Jiangsu—Commune industry: Guanghui de sanshiwu nian: Jiangsu sheng guomin jingji he 
shehui fazhan tongji ziliao, 1949-1983 (The glorious thirty-five years: Statistics on Jiangsu's 
national economy and social development, 1949-1983; Nianjing; Jiangsu tongji ju, 1984), 
pp. 21-22, for total gross value of industrial output, and p. 44, for commune and brigade 
industrial output. The brigade output is also listed under agricultural output on p. 29. I hav e 
included only commune industrial output in the calculations in this table. This source does 
not state what prices were used, but if one compares these data with others, the prices appear 
to be in constant 1980 prices. Collective industry for 1962-1983 was derived by subtracting 
reported gross value of industrial output for state enterprises from total gross value of i ndustrial 
output. State industrial output was estimated from figures on the province's industrial labor 
force provided by the Jiangsu statistical bureau (Penelope B. Prime, "The Impact of Self-
Sufficiency on Regional Industrial Growth and Productivity in Post-1949 China: The Case of 
Jiangsu Province," PhD dissertation, University of Michigan, 1987, table 4.16, p. 109), and 
from figures for state industrial output per worker (Guanghui de sanshiwu nian, p. 46). 
For Guangdong—Guangdong sheng tongji nianjian (Guangdong's statistical yearbook; Hong 
Kong, Xianggang jingji daobao she, 1984), p. 146, given in 1957 prices for 1952-1971, in 
1970 prices for 1971-1981, and in 1980 prices for 1981-1983. 
For Liaoning—Liaoning jingji tongji Nianjian, 1983 (Liaoning's economic yearbook, 1983; 
Shenyang, Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1983), p. 361. The Liaoning data are based on 1952 
prices for 1949-1957, 1957 prices for 1957-1971, 1970 prices for 1971-1981, and 1980 
prices for 1981 and 1982. 
All 1985 figures were calculated from Zhongguo tongji n ianjian, 1986, p. 282. 
a. Proportions of commune industry are subsets of collective proportions; total gross value of 
industrial output used in denominator includes commune industrial output. 
b. 1982 figure. 
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and then to .274 in 1978. In Liaoning it increased from .066 in 1965 
to .154 in 1975 and to .164 in 1978. In Jiangsu the proportion of 
collective industry rose from .114 in 1965 to .280 in 1975. By 1978 
this proportion had increased to .340—a full third of the province's total 
gross value of industrial output. 
The proportion of commune industry also increased substantially for 
these three provinces. In Guangdong the proportion of commune indus­
try in total gross value of industrial output in 1965 was .017. It had 
increased to .036 by 1976 and to .067 by 1978. In Liaoning in 1965 
the same proportion was .003, increasing to .023 in 1975 and to .034 
in 1978. In Jiangsu the proportion of commune industry was .011 in 
1965, .065 in 1975, and .120 in 1978. 
In Jiangsu, then, the growth of both collective industry and commune 
industry was faster than the national average. These higher-than-average 
local contributions to industrial output help to explain Jiangsu's rela­
tively faster growth seen in Table 1. If state-owned enterprises in the 
"five small industries" could be added to collective and commune figures, 
the increase in industrial output produced locally primarily for local con­
sumption would be even higher. 
Evidence from particular areas of Jiangsu also indicates a growing im­
portance of local industry within this province. Wuxi County and 
Changzhou are two of the better-known cases. A third example is Ru-
dong County near Nantong. Between 1966 and 1976 the total number 
of industrial enterprises in this county increased from 107 to 396.4 The 
components of this increase were as follows: state-owned enterprises from 
23 to 42, cooperative factories from 14 to 58, rural town enterprises 
from 7 to 20, and commune and brigade enterprises from 5 to 222. The 
only decrease was in handicraft shops, which declined from 58 to 54. 
Some of these changes in Rudong and elsewhere were no doubt reclas­
sifications, and perhaps some enterprises were divided into several "new" 
ones. Nevertheless, the substantial increases in the number and share of 
collective enterprises, as well as the increases in total industrial output, 
indicate that provinces, and especially Jiangsu, responded to calls from 
the center to "promote production" at all levels of the economy. 
PATTERNS OF INVESTMENT 
One important aspect to consider in trying to understand how the growth 
of local industry might have affected central-provincial relations is how 
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this growth was financed. Although separate data on investment in col­
lective industry before 1978 are not available, information on the shares 
of investment supplied through the provincial and central budgets and 
on the share of investment going to industry is adequate to explain at 
least part of Jiangsu's industrial growth. 
The largest category of budgetary fixed investment is state capital con­
struction investment, or "basic construction" (jihen jianshe). Table 3 gives 
total state capital construction investment as well as separate figures for 
this investment in Jiangsu contributed by the central budget and Jiang­
su's own capital construction expenditure (at the provincial level and all 
levels below the province). 
Figures supplied elsewhere on budgetary investment for the whole of 
China indicate that the CR period was characterized by high investment 
levels. Table 3 shows that investment in Jiangsu mirrored these national 
trends. Total (provincial and central) budgetary capital construction in­
vestment in the province increased from .416 billion yuan in 1966 to 
1.244 billion in 1976. This represents an average increase of 18 percent 
per year. Investment in 1976 alone was greater than the total for the 
entire First Five-Year Plan. 
Separating provincial (and lower-level) investment from central invest­
ment shows that investment from the provincial budget increased from 
.214 billion to .878 billion yuan over the same period. Between 1970 
and 1978 provincial funds represented an average of 75 percent of total 
capital construction investment in the province; the remaining 25 per­
cent was contributed by the center. This compares with a provincial 
contribution of between 40 and 50 percent in the 1950s, 1960s (exclud­
ing the Great Leap Forward), and 1980s. 
This growth in provincial investment also represents an increase rela­
tive to the size of the provincial economy measured by provincial income. 
Provincial income (Table 4) refers to the provincial equivalent of national 
income (quomin shouru), a measure similar to gross national product.5 
Adjusting changes in investment for growth in the economy provides an 
indicator of the importance of these levels of investment. 
Table 5 and Figure 1 show provincial, central, and total investment 
in Jiangsu as proportions of provincial income. The second column in 
Table 5 gives Jiangsu's provincial budgetary capital construction invest­
ment as a proportion of provincial income. In 1966 this proportion was 
.024, increasing to .057 by 1976. The average for the period was .042. 
This compares with an average of .019 during the First Five-Year Plan 
TABLE 3 Provincial, Central, and Total Budgetary 
State Capital Construction Investment in 
Jiangsu, 1953-1987 
(in billions of yuan, current prices) 
Year Provincial Central Total 
1953-1957 0.413 0.666 1.079 
1957 0.128 0.237 0.365 
1958 0.842 0.074 0.916 
1959 0.942 0.270 1.212 
1960 1.080 0.284 1.364 
1961 0.293 0.119 0.412 
1962 0.131 0.083 0.214 
1963 0.149 0.164 0.313 
1964 0.190 0.266 0.456 
1965 0.210 0.237 0.447 
1966 0.214 0.202 0.416 
1967 0.157 0.152 0.309 
1968 0.137 0.131 0.268 
1969 0.259 0.087 0.346 
1970 0.501 0.100 0.601 
1971 0.595 0.161 0.756 
1972 0.731 0.184 0.915 
1973 0.810 0.190 1.000 
1974 0.704 0.157 0.861 
1975 0.761 0.314 1.075 
1976 0.878 0.366 1.244 
1977 0.815 0.460 1.275 
1978 1.143 0.635 1.778 
1979 1.429 0.775 2.204 
1980 1.820 0.795 2.615 
1981 0.913 0.863 1.776 
1982 1.048 0.995 2.043 
1983 0.982 1.516 2.498 
1984 1.182 2.030 3.212 
1985 2.055 2.680 4.735 
1986 2.569 3.473 6.042 
1987 3.242 4.647 7.889 
Sources: G uanghui de sanshiwu nian, pp. 57-58; Jiangsu jingji nianjian 1988 
(Jiangsu's economic yearbook, 1988; Nanjing, Nanjing daxue chu-
banshe, 1988), p. Ill—59; Jiangsu tongji nianjian 1988 (Jiangsu's statis­
tical yearbook 1988; Nanjing, Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1988), pp. 
243-244. 
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TABLE 4 Annual Provincial Income for Jiangsu, 1952— 
1987 (in billions of yuan, current prices) 
Year Provincial Inc ome Year Provincial Inco me 
1952 3-563 1970 10.372 
1953 4.028 1971 12.107 
1954 4.017 1972 12.929 
1955 4.476 1973 14.232 
1956 4.636 1974 14.157 
1957 4.869 1975 15.146 
1958 5.812 1976 15.387 
1959 6.075 1977 16.583 
1960 6.630 1978 20.828 
1961 5.232 1979 25.792 
1962 4.986 1980 27.289 
1963 5.650 1981 29.857 
1964 7.032 1982 33.500 
1965 7.489 1983 38.240 
1966 8.843 1984 46.631 
1967 7.861 1985 57.846 
1968 8.123 1986 66.390 
1969 8.857 1987 77.453 
Sources: Jiangsu jingji nianjian, 1986 (Jiangsu economic yearbook, 1986; Nanjing, Jiangsu 
renmin chubanshe, 1986), p. Ill-11 ; Jiangsu jingji nianjian, 1988, p. Ill—21. 
and .027 between 1962 and 1965. Only the Great Leap had higher pro­
vincial investment/income ratios. 
But to what extent was the increase in provincial investment due to 
the 1970 decentralization? If accounting substitution was occurring as a 
result of decentralization, we would expect central capital construction 
funds to fall as provincial funds rose. In absolute terms the center's cap­
ital construction contribution to Jiangsu did not fall during or after 1970; 
in fact it began to increase (Table 3). But if we look again at central 
capital construction investment in Jiangsu as a proportion of provincial 
income (Table 5 and Figure 1), we see that the center's investment did 
fall between 1969 and 1974 in relation to provincial growth.6 So part of 
the jump in Jiangsu's investment from the provincial budget was no 
doubt due to accounting changes from the 1970 decentralization, and 
not just to additional resources supplied by the province. 
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TABLE 5 Provincial and Central Budgetary State 
Capital Construction Investment as 
Proportions of Provincial Income in 
Jiangsu, 1953-1987 
Year Provincial Central Total 
1953-1957 .019 .030 .049 
1957 .026 .049 .075 
1958 .145 .013 .158 
1959 .155 .045 .200 
1960 .163 .043 .206 
1961 .056 .023 .079 
1962 .026 .017 .043 
1963 .026 .029 .055 
1964 .027 .038 .065 
1965 .028 .032 .060 
1966 .024 .023 .047 
1967 .020 .019 .039 
1968 .017 .016 .033 
1969 .029 .010 .039 
1970 .048 .010 .058 
1971 .049 .013 .062 
1972 .057 .014 .071 
1973 .057 .013 .070 
1974 .050 .011 .061 
1975 .050 .021 .071 
1976 .057 .024 .081 
1977 .049 .028 .077 
1978 .055 .030 .085 
1979 .055 .030 .085 
1980 .067 .029 .096 
1981 .031 .028 .059 
1982 .031 .030 .061 
1983 .026 .040 .066 
1984 .025 .044 .069 
1985 .036 .046 .082 
1986 .039 .052 .091 
1987 .042 .060 .102 
Sources: Tables 3 and 4 in this chapter. 
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Figure 1 Provincial and Central Budgetary Capital Construc­
tion Investment 
Nevertheless, beginning in 1969 total budgetary investment in the 
province clearly increased, in both absolute and relative terms. The ini­
tial decrease in the center's share was more than compensated for by 
increases in investment through the provincial budget. By 1976 the pro­
portion of total state capital construction investment relative to pro­
vincial income was higher than in any previous period except for the 
Great Leap Forward, and it continued to increase until 1980. 
Where did these additional funds for investment come from? One 
major source was a shift in expenditures first toward "accumulation" (jilei) 
and away from consumption, and second, within expenditures for accu­
mulation, toward "productive accumulation" (for example, machinery) 
and away from "nonproductive accumulation" (for example, housing). 
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Table 6 summarizes these shifts for Jiangsu. The share of accumulation 
in provincial income was 19-5 percent during the First Five-Year Plan, 
with a corresponding share of consumption of 80.5 percent. The accu­
mulation share rose to 24.1 percent during the Great Leap Forward and 
then fell to 21.2 percent in the recovery period. Then, since the begin­
ning of the Cultural Revolution, the accumulation share rose steadily to 
22.8 percent between 1966 and 1970 and to 30.5 percent between 1971 
and 1975. This rise continued into the reform period to reach 33-1 per­
cent between 1981 and 1985. Within accumulation, expenditures for 
productive investment followed a similar pattern until it peaked at 91-9 
percent during the 1971—1975 period. This extremely high level was 
not sustained after 1975. 
Concurrently with a shift in expenditure toward investment, there was 
a shift within investment toward industry. Table 7 shows that industry's 
share of total investment in Jiangsu averaged 60 percent between 1966 
and 1975, a level comparable to the Great Leap period. In the 1950s 
industry's share had been less than 40 percent, and between 1963 and 
1965 it was less than 50 percent. Also, within industry, heavy industrial 
investment represented a full 90 percent of all industrial budgetary in­
vestment in the province between 1966 and 1975.7 
Clearly horizontal shifts in expenditure priorities contributed signifi­
cantly to the industrial growth that occurred in Jiangsu during the CR 
TABLE 6 Proportions of Provincial Income used for 
Accumulation and Consumption in Jiangsu, 
1953-1985 
Year Consumption Accumulation 
Productive Inve stment 
within Accumulation 
1953-1957 .805 .195 .780 
1958-1962 .759 .241 .899 
1963-1965 .788 .212 .858 
1966-1970 .772 .228 .859 
1971-1975 .695 .305 .919 
1976-1980 .679 .321 .793 
1981-1985 .669 .331 .648 
Source: Calculated from figures given in Jiangsu jingji nianjian, 1988, pp. 111-24 and III—25. 
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TABLE 7 Proportions of Total State Budgetary Capital 
Construction Investment by Sector in Jiangsu, 
1953-1987 
Culture, Urban 
Educa­ Infra­
Indus­ Agri­ Trans­ Com­ tion, and struc­
Year try culture port merce Health ture Other 
1953-1957 .386 .348 .043 .054 .137 .029 .003 
1958-1962 .575 .181 .155 .018 .043 .017 .009 
1963-1965 .482 .277 .129 .021 .049 .035 .007 
1966-1970 .568 .217 .120 .040 .020 .023 .013 
1971-1975 .614 .176 .124 .037 .024 .011 .013 
1976-1980 .606 .118 .108 .045 .039 .039 .044 
1981-1985 .544 .039 .133 .056 .057 .062 .107 
1987 .605 .023 .143 .032 .057 .058 .082 
Source: C alculated from figures given in Jiangsu jingji nianjian, 1988, p. Ill—64. 
period. These horizontal shifts in expenditure between sectors have also 
been shown to have occurred within the central budget as well.8 Some 
vertical shift in budgetary expenditure from the center to the province 
occurred because of decentralization, but the evidence is inconclusive on 
whether this was more than just an accounting change. 
A final consideration with respect to investment is that state capital 
construction investment is only part of total investment. Sources of "ex-
trabudgetary" funds became more important from the late 1960s on­
ward, and local officials often used these funds for investment in new 
enterprises (see Chapters 7 and 8). For example, enterprises were allowed 
to retain their depreciation funds after 1967, ostensibly for "replacement 
and renovation" (genxin gaizao) investment, and collective enterprises could 
retain a proportion of their profits. To the extent that these funds were 
available and used for new investment, provincial and therefore total in­
vestment in the province would be even higher than Tables 3 and 5 
show. The importance of these funds in Jiangsu during the period is not 
known, because figures for Jiangsu on replacement and renovation in­
vestment, and extrabudgetary funds generally, are not available before 
1978. However, the next section looks at budgetary data for additional 
clues to the central-provincial equation during the CR period and sug­
gests that the role of extrabudgetary funds was relatively minor until the 
reform period. 
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CENTRAL-PROVINCIAL FINANCE IN JIANGSU 
DURING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION 
A key factor in central-provincial relations is the budget. In China's 
"unified" budgetary system, the majority of revenues are collected at the 
provincial level and below, and then are remitted to the center. Collected 
revenues, then, refer to the sum of profits and taxes paid to the finance 
offices at all provincial administrative levels, excluding profits and taxes 
of centrally run enterprises, which go directly into the central budget.9 
Remitted revenues are the portion of the province's collected revenues 
that is turned over to the central budget by the provincial finance bureau. 
The remaining portion of the province's collected revenues is allocated 
through the provincial budget. 
Table 8 presents Jiangsu's collected revenues, remitted revenues, and 
revenues retained by the province for expenditures.10 In absolute terms 
both the revenues collected by the province and the amount the province 
remitted to the center increased after 1969, with the exception of 1974. 
It is again more revealing to look at these revenue categories as com­
pared with growth in the provincial economy. These proportions are given 
TABLE 8 Revenues Collected, Revenues Remitted, 
and Revenues Retained in Jiangsu, 
1952—1987 (in billions of yuan) 
Revenue Revenue Revenue 
Collected Remitted Retained 
Year by Prov ince to Center as Expend iture 
1952 0.680 0.470 0.210 
1953 0.778 0.528 0.250 
1954 0.867 0.579 0.288 
1955 0.847 0.558 0.289 
1956 0.966 0.558 0.408 
1957 1.010 0.530 0.480 
1958 1.782 0.655 1.127 
1959 2.494 1.058 1.436 
1960 2.619 0.867 1.752 
1961 1.745 0.879 0.866 
1962 1.331 0.744 0.587 
1963 1.370 0.707 0.663 
1964 1.724 0.974 0.750 
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Revenue Revenue Revenue 
Collected Remitted Retained 
Year by Prov ince to Center as Expen diture 
1965 1.940 1.142 0.798 
1966 2.289 1.384 0.905 
1967 1.702 0.908 0.794 
1968 1.620 1.006 0.614 
1969 2.174 1.316 0.858 
1970 2.866 1.733 1.133 
1971 3.412 2.161 1.251 
1972 3.784 2.287 1.497 
1973 4.222 2.591 1.631 
1974 3.951 2.162 1.789 
1975 4.341 2.571 1.770 
1976 4.402 2.531 1.871 
1977 5.165 3.169 1.996 
1978 6.109 3.271 2.838 
1979 5.928 2.722 3.206 
1980 6.245 3.350 2.895 
1981 6.304 3.925 2.379 
1982 6.661 4.198 2.463 
1983 7.307 4.078 3.229 
1984 7.628 3.713 3.915 
1985 8.899 3.846 5.053 
1986 9.872 3.256 6.616 
1987 10.717 3-917 6.800 
Sources: J iangsu jingji nianjian, 1986, p. Ill-50; Jiangsu jingji nianjian, 1988, p. 
Ill—87. 
Note: Figures for remittances are calculated as the difference between revenues col­
lected and expenditures. Note that revenue and expenditure data for Jiangsu 
published in 1988 had been adjusted for 1984 and 1985 compared with 
figures for these years published in 1986. Also, in 1986 data for 1952-1966 
had been adjusted from figures released earlier. 
in Table 9 and Figure 2. With decentralization in 1970, the proportions 
of both revenue collected by the provincial government and revenue re­
mitted to the central government increased. Between 1970 and 1978 the 
proportion of collected revenue averaged 29 percent, compared with only 
20 percent during the First Five-Year Plan and 24 percent between 1963 
and 1969. This increase would be expected as a result of decentralization, 
since more enterprises turned over their profits and taxes to the provincial 
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budget instead of directly to the central budget. This proportion reached 
a high of 34 percent during the Great Leap Forward for the same reason. 
But Jiangsu's remittances to the central budget as a proportion of total 
provincial income also increased during the CR period. This proportion 
averaged . 17 between 1970 and 1978, compared with an average of . 15 
during the First Five-Year Plan and Great Leap Forward and . 13 during 
the 1960S. If decentralization had meant a weakening of central control, 
we might expect provincial remittances to have decreased, since more 
government revenue was now incorporated into the provincial budget. 
The fact that remittances to the center increased suggests that decentral­
ization did not result in smaller revenue transfers from the province to 
the center. 
Further strengthening this result is the fact that the proportion of 
retained revenues that made up the province's budget remained stable 
during the CR period. This proportion fluctuated between 10 and 12 
TABLE 9 Revenues Collected, Revenues Remitted, 
and Revenues Retained in Jiangsu, 
1952-1987 
Year 
Revenue 
Collected 
by Pro vince 
Revenue 
Remitted 
to Center 
Revenue 
Retained 
as Expend iture 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1861 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
.191 
.193 
.216 
.189 
.208 
.207 
.307 
.411 
.395 
.334 
.267 
.242 
.245 
.259 
.259 
.217 
.199 
.132 
.131 
.144 
.124 
.120 
.108 
.113 
.175 
.131 
.168 
.149 
.125 
.138 
.152 
.157 
.116 
.123 
.059 
.062 
.072 
.065 
.088 
.099 
.194 
.236 
.264 
.166 
.118 
.117 
.107 
.107 
.102 
.101 
.076 
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Revenue Revenue Revenue 
Collected Remitted Retained 
Year by Prov ince to Center as Expend iture 
1969 .245 .148 .097 
1970 .276 .167 .109 
1971 .282 .179 .103 
1972 .293 AIT .116 
1973 .297 .182 .115 
1974 .279 .153 .126 
1975 .287 .170 .117 
1976 .286 .164 .122 
1977 .311 .191 .120 
1978 .293 .157 .136 
1979 .230 .106 .124 
1980 .229 .123 .106 
1981 .211 .131 .080 
1982 .199 .125 .074 
1983 .191 .107 .084 
1984 .164 .080 .084 
1985 .154 .067 .087 
1986 .149 .049 .100 
1987 .138 .050 .088 
Sources: Annual revenue and expenditure figures are from Jiangsu jingji nianjian, 1986, 
p. Ill—50, and Jiangsu jingji nianjian, 1988, p. Ill—87; provincial income is 
from Table 4 in this chapter. 
percent between 1969 and 1973, and then between 12 and 14 percent 
until 1979- Again it does not seem that the provincial budget gained at 
the expense of the central budget as a result of either the 1970 decen­
tralization or the growing importance of local industry in the province. 
These results also suggest that extrabudgetary revenue probably did not 
increase significantly in proportion to growth in the provincial economy. 
These trends during the Cultural Revolution stand in sharp contrast 
to what occurred during the reform period. Compared with 17 percent 
in the 1970s, remittances as a proportion of provincial income averaged 
only 10 percent between 1978 and 1987, falling to 5 percent in 1986 
and 1987. This change, however, did not mean the provincial budget 
therefore rose. Revenue collected as a proportion of provincial income 
also began to fall after 1977, when it had reached it highest level since 
the Great Leap Forward. The net effect has decreased the province's re-
PRIME 
Figure 2 Revenues Collected, Revenues Remitted, and Reve­
nues Retained 
tained revenue, and therefore the size of the provincial budget relative to 
growth in the provincial economy, to an average of 9.6 percent since 
1977, hitting a low of 7.4 percent in 1982. 
The overall effect on decentralization of the reform policies has been 
very different from that of the Cultural Revolution and earlier periods. 
As the provincial economy has grown, the role of the state budget at 
both the provincial and the central levels has shrunk significantly. If 
access to funds outside the state budgetary system has any relation to 
local control, as we might expect, then the change in the central-pro­
vincial balance of power during the 1980s and later has surely been much 
greater than during the 1970s or earlier. 
Looking at a specific example of the combined effects of Maoist economic 
policies during the Cultural Revolution adds perspective to our under­
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standing of this period. For example, in provinces that did not receive 
Third Front, central investment, we might expect industrial growth to 
have been modest; or where industrial growth was concentrated at local 
levels, we might expect to see that local financing grew as the center's 
role fell. In Jiangsu neither of these was the actual outcome. Instead, all 
levels of the economic system responded to directives and incentives to 
increase investment in industry, with little apparent effect on the central-
provincial budgetary system. 
As a result of the response to industry, a key characteristic of this 
period was a major horizontal shift in resources to industry from other 
sectors. As during the Great Leap, even agriculture was to be promoted 
by increasing industrial inputs, with the result that industrial develop­
ment was put first. This priority can be clearly seen in both investment 
and output trends. 
The problem was, however, that the industrial strategy was neither 
coordinated nor based on economic criteria. Some enterprises were prof­
itable, but many were not. Problems of duplication, input shortages, and 
poor technology led to inefficiency and waste, paid for by the increasing 
share of resources going to industry. This investment bias within the 
system was reinforced by the increasing local role, but there was little to 
ensure proper use of investment funds. The resulting imbalances and 
inefficiencies eventually worsened enough to cause a crisis at the center. 
The maintenance of the flow of funds from localities to the center 
throughout the Cultural Revolution is perhaps one reason the crisis did 
not occur sooner. 
Whether all the trends observed in Jiangsu were also occurring else­
where in China remains to be explored. Figures for the national level 
suggest that the growth of local industry and the industrial investment 
bias were occurring in many places. With respect to the budget, if the 
growth of local industry was affecting revenue flows, we would expect to 
see evidence of this influence in Jiangsu, where local industry grew sub­
stantially faster than the national average. That it did not suggests that 
provinces and municipalities that historically contributed major shares of 
their revenues to the center, like Jiangsu, probably continued to do so.11 
If this is the case, Jiangsu's story suggests a hypothesis that would ex­
plain the coexistence of ambitious central projects with local industriali­
zation. 
